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Introduction
Despite the political upheavals, conflicts, war and genocide generated by
unequal and unjust minority-majority relations, the term minority people
entered social science terminology for the first time in 19321• According to
Davis (1979: 2), minority studies were initially largely confined to the study
of race/ethnic relations, culture, and religion, and it was only during the late
1970s that minority-dominant majority relations began to gain analytical and
political significance. Three factors contributed to the increased interest in
minority studies during this period: 1) the anti-colonial movement and the
recognition of what Carpenter (1990) calls the 'South as a Conscious
Minority'; 2) the maturation of the civil rights movement; 3) the genocide
committed against the Jewish and Gypsy minorities in Europe between the
First and the Second World Wars. In the international arena, it took the
United Nations almost 44 years after the adoption of the UN Declaration on
Human rights to adopt the Declaration on the Rights ofPersons Belonging
to Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (December 18, 1992).
Ironically it was the Representative ofYugoslavia who introduced the Draft
Resolution (UN Doc. E/CNA/1992/L.16) to the UN Commission on Human
Rights for approval.
To be sure, the concern of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belong-
ing to Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities with the equal enjoyment
of all rights and non-discrimination in the application of these rights was
directly or indirectly expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. These rights also appear in a dozen or so conventions, including the
Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination (1966)
and the Covenant on Civil Political and Cultural Rights (Article 27), and a
multitude of other human rights instruments enacted within the orbit of the
United Nations system.' This has culminated in a genuine international
effort to stamp out the inhumane treatment of minority populations.
Such is the condition of minority groups that the sub-commision discussing
article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has failed to reach a
consensus on how a minority group should be defined.' Many nations have
perceived a binding definition either as an infringement of their sovereignty
or a potential instrument to be used by minority groups to challenge their
authority. The following definition was considered unacceptable by a num- ~
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ber of representatives: 'a group of citizens of a state, considered a numerical
minority and in a non-dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority
of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated,
if only implicitly, by collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve
equality with the 'majority in fact or law'. Since this definition was not
approved by all country representatives in the Human Rights Commission,
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the Declaration remained without a binding definition, leaving the door open
for states to add attributes or subtract those deemed politically controversial."
Chaliand (1987:5-7) describes two historical causes for the emergence of
minorities: first, groups long settled in a given territory which are invaded
by, and later intermingle with, populations from surrounding territories.
Second, minority populations introduced by force into new areas, such as
Africans in the Americas or Indian labourers dislocated from their countries
during British colonial rule (for example, the migration of Indian labourers
to Britain, South Africa, East Africa and Fiji). -
I add two more categories to the above: minorities in ethnically divided states
with a large and often dominant ethnic group or groups. This is a general
characteristic of almost all developing countries. Second, social minorities,
or what Townsend (1973) referred to as individuals or families who have
some characteristic in common which marks them off from 'ordinary'
people. These characteristics prevent them from having access to, or being
accorded, certain rights which are available to others, and make them less
likely to receive a certain quantity and quality of resources. This category
includes people with social handicaps, a different sexual orientation, chil-
dren, the aged, etc. Townsend's definition therefore implies that there is no
society in the world without a minority.
Sadly, since the adoption of (though not as a consequence of) the Declaration
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious; and Linguistic
Minorities in 1992, the world has suffered several setbacks in minority-dom-
inant majority relations: the Rwanda genocide, the mayhem in Bosnia and
Kosovo, the wanton destruction in Chechnya, the waste of thousands of lives
in Liberia, Sierra Leone and East Timor. The industrial world has also wit-
nessed the emergence ofneo-Nazi groups in the countries, such as Germany,
that bred Nazism. The neo-Nazi assault on asylum seekers, immigrants and
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minority groups in Europe has cost scores of lives in the first nine months of
the new millennium.
A glimpse at the state of the world shows us immediately that, with 184 large
and small states, 600 living languages and 5,000 ethnic groups (Kymlika
1995: 4), it is hardly a world of majorities. There are currently 52 unrepre-
sented minority nations and peoples belonging to oppressed minorities which
are aspiring to create autonomous nation-states separate from those they are
coerced to identify with. In all of these cases, the majority controls the state
and denies the minority the right to self-determination.
The very term minority - particularly disadvantaged minority - invites con-
cern for physical safety, psychological well-being and material needs. This
concern arises from the fact that these minorities exist among groups that
possess the power to subject them to unequal treatment (Davis 1979: xiii).
Equally, a minority - whether, cultural, religious or linguistic - is a social
entity that manifests itself in a collective subjectivity (Fenet 1989:17).
A minority is not a passive entity. The political history of a large number of
post-independent states is overwhelmed by minority struggles for self-deter-
mination, including territorial claims against occupation, or is full of stories
of minority struggles for civil-rights, political representation and recognition
in states constituted of a dominant majority.
Minority problems, as this paper will illustrate, are not the monopoly of, or
an unholy characteristic of, industrial development or the developing world.
They are a worldwide phenomenon which manifests itself differently in dif-
ferent historical contexts and socioeconomic and political environments.
However, the similarity of the problems encountered by minorities in indus-
trially advanced democracies and the developing world, whether social, cul-
tural, religious or ethnic, alerts us to the importance of breaking down the
boundaries of conventional definition to seek a comprehensive understand-
ing of these problems.
This paper is not about romanticizing minorities or treating them as an undif-
ferentiated social entity. Minorities are diverse, not only socially and eco-
nomically, but also politically and in their capacity to access power and
resources. Despite this great depth and breadth, historically the world of ~
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minorities is a world of unequal treatment, injustice, marginality and strug-
gle for survival and all those subjected to such treatment are a minority even
where they may belong to the numerical majority.' Minorities apply a wide
variety of coping strategies, modes of struggle and collective action in deal-
ing with oppression and improving their survival possibilities. The Tutsi in
Burundi, the white minority in South Africa before the end of the apartheid
regime, the Alawite in Syria, the Sunni Arabs in Iraq and the Jews in Israel
are just a few examples of dominant minorities." Minority also does not
include those who conceive of themselves as a 'superior minority', such as
the minority populations of German origin in Latin America (Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and Peru) (Chaliand 1987: 6). The case of domi-
nant minorities makes us realize that minorities are not the passive recipients
of majority oppression, nor immune from oppressing others. To that extent,
they are social entities, a construction of a social reality and their position in
the polity of the nation-state. Nevertheless, on the whole, history has so far
shown that there are more oppressed than oppressive minorities in the world.
This paper attempts to broaden the interest in minority studies by question-
ing the viability of convention politics of development to articulate minority
interests. It argues that an alternative politics of development would betray
its mission if it treated minority questions as a mere by-product of failed
modernization, structural dependence, unequal exchange or dismal growth
rate. In essence, the paper delineates minority issues within the current poli-
tics of development paradigm informed by modernization revisionism.
Hence this paper articulates the relationship between three interrelated tra-
jectories: minority and the nation-state, minority and democracy, and minor-
ity and authoritarian development. It interrogates the political making of
minority in a nation-state legitimized by majority nation or nations, hence
creating a potential majoritarian tyranny. Embedded in the discourse of
nation-state and liberal democracy, majoritarian tyranny is not a by-product
of the democratic nation-state, it is part of it.
As will be illustrated in the course of this paper, although the nation-state is
presumed dead, a virtual nation-state has persisted, aided by a virtual major-
ity, a reference point in the struggle for legitimacy to sustain the majority's
holding of power. In the circumstances, social constructs such as state and
democracy have become the dominant institutions entrusted with legitimiz-
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ing the tyranny of the majority. Because the state commands protective and
restrictive powers, its failure to intervene in protecting the minority in the
face of majority oppression identifies the state with that oppression. In such
circumstances, the only safeguard against state totalitarianism lies less with
the democratic nature of the state and more with the interplay of diverse
interests and expectations the state is obliged to serve. Hence while political
pluralism may deter state oppression, it does little to prevent the abuse of the
minority by renegade interests that :~re, according to their adherence, served
by authoritarian rather than democratic means.
Minorities and the nation-state
State formation, a comparatively recent historical phenomena dating back to
the 16th and 19th centuries, marked the shift from the conception that the
state should coincide with a proper boundary to that of a state with a given
people who constituted a nation. The people who comprise the nation,
according to Beetham (1999: 209) 'became the sole source from which the
state could derive its legitimacy; and the nation became the sole legitimate
object of people's political allegiance'. The nation-state became a universal-
ly accepted phenomenon only after the Second World War, augmented by the
end of colonialism and the emergence of independent states in the ex-
colonies. The so-called new states are in fact a colonial construction with a
much more recent experience with modem conceptions of nation formation.
As colonial constructions comprising a multitude or-nations, post-colonial
states have been in continuous search for a dominant nation that satisfies the
requirements of a semblance of the European nation-state. In fact in most
developing countries, the dominant nations assume the role of providing the
symbols of nationhood, including a dominant language, a dominant culture,
even a dominant religion.
The idea of the nation-state implies that nations consist of people who con-
sider themselves one, with a historical identity, geographical contiguity and
shared cultural characteristics. Nations 'require a state to protect their cul-
tural identity, economic well-being and distinctive way of life' (Beetham
1999: 217). This narrow definition of nation-state has been shaken but not
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· completely dismantled as many commentators would have hoped.'
However, in the real world, nation-state theory, as depicted above, has been
confronted by several challenges. There is hardly a state in today's world that
conflates nation and state, or without a sizeable minority. This is more so in
the developing world, where each state is the home of scores of ethnic
groups, nations, peoples and nationalities. It is here that the search for a
nation to ensure majority support and state legitimacy becomes more diffi-
cult and the concept of nation-state itself becomes elusive.
The challenge for the nation-state lies in its ability to develop institutions that
are capable not only of being even-handed but also of awakening the invisi-
ble voice. More important for such institutions is to make that voice heard
and ensure that its legitimate grievances are acted upon. Civil wars and long
struggles for self-determination are often fuelled by a nation-state controlled
by an arrogant majority that does not listen to minority grievances. Taylor
(1998: 204) warns of the real danger of the lack of communication in minor-
ity-dominant majority relations, saying that where minority groups are not
heard, a minority may feel that their way of seeing things is different from
the majority. The minority may also feel that it is generally not understood
or recognized by the majority. Consequently, the majority may also not be
ready to alter the terms of the debate to accommodate its differences with the
minority, and therefore that the minority is being systematically unheard. If
the minority felt that its voice couldn't really penetrate the public debate or
part of the state as a deliberative unit. In my view, minority-dominant major-
ity conflicts often occur when the minority - for real or imaginary reasons -
feels that the majority uses its privileged position to deny ita voice in the
political arena as part of the deliberative unit called the state.
.:',
The centrality of the state in society, its pervasive nature, capacity to influ-
ence events, protect, oppress, control and distribute resources make it a focus \.,
of intense competition between diverse social forces. Both minority and
majority seek to find expression in the state institutions and the private and
public spheres it creates. Minority and majority also aspire to control the
state, the ultimate authority for law, the use of power and coercive sanctions
backed by the monopoly of force. The state's capacity to extract revenue,
recruit personnel and provide sources of income and privilege also attracts
intense competition and conflict.
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The coexistence of nations and/or cultural communities (identifiable by eth-
nicity, religion or language) within one state constitutes a challenge to the
nation-state's capacity to be even-handed. Conflicts occur when the state is
incapable of living up to its responsibility as an arbiter of different minority-
dominant majority claims. Historically, intense competition develops into
violent conflicts in which majority or minority resorts to force: Such situa-
tions may include instances when the minority demands a measure of polit-
ical autonomy, or outright separation, or incorporation in an already existing
state. Beetham (1984: 218) explains how minority-dominant majority ten-
sions can exacerbate and develop into major conflicts, leading to genocide,
discrimination, oppression, dislocation and displacement. I will elaborate
each of these further with a few examples.
Genocide
Examples of genocide are the cases of the European Jews and the more
recent events in Rwanda. In the first case, it is estimated that in 1939 about
10 million of the estimated 16 million Jews in the world lived in Europe. By
1945 the holocaust had claimed the lives of almost six million European
Jews, with an estimated 4.6 million perishing in Poland and other areas
seized by the Soviet Union and occupied by Germany. The suffering of the
Jewish minority in Europe is beyond imagination. However, equally alarm-
ing is the treatment of the Palestinians by the state of Israel and the re-emer-
gence of neo-Nazism. With the memories of the holocaust still very much
alive, these developments are bewildering and disheartening and show that
the lessons of history have hardly been understood.·
A more recent case of genocide took place in Rwanda. The genocide com-
mitted by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority, which claimed more
than 800,000 lives and displaced another million people, shocked the world.
But there was another tragedy in Rwanda about which the world has kept
silent - the genocide of the Batwa, the minority of the minority. The Batwa
of Rwanda comprise some 10,000 to 20,000 people, and inhabit an area of
about 26,338 km2 on the Rwandan side of Burundi and in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The Batwa constitute 0.4% of Rwanda's 7.3 million
inhabitants, a small minority compared to the Hutu (85%) and the Tutsi
(14%). In common with the Hutu and the Tutsi, all Batwa sneak
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Kinyarwanda, the main language of the populations of Burundi and Rwanda.
The Batwa have historically been an oppressed minority in the competition
between the Hutu and the Tutsi to control the state. Sebalinda (1993: 164),
the Deputy Legal Representative of the Association for the Global
Development of the Batwa of Rwanda (ADBR), summed up the sentiments
of an excluded minority and the manner in which it has been treated by the
Tutsi-Hutu dominated state apparatus thus: 'From time immemorial, the
Batwa were considered by their neighbours as mentally backward, as.buf-
foons, as executioners, as imbeciles, as villains, indeed as next to wild beasts
and fit to be marginalized. The Hutu and the Tutsi were clearly their masters
during the Monarcho-colonial period as well as after independence. '"
During the First Republic that lasted twelve years, nothing was done for the
welfare of the Batwa. They were always excluded from the country's wealth.
Even though a bit was done to improve their situation during the Second
Republic, such as allowing access to secondary school education and even to
university for a small number of Batwa, it was too little to be significant.
Thus no Mutwa (or Batwa) is to be found among ministers, director-gener-
als, province governance, district chiefs, local councillors, heads of public
institutions or private enterprises', including those in their area and where
qualified Batwa are in great numbers.
Discrimination and oppression
Slavery and apartheid are the most extreme forms of minority oppression.
Here I would like to highlight the case of slavery in the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania. Mauritania's population (estimated at 2,581,738 in July 1999) is
divided into mixed Maurlblack (Berber) 40%, Maur (Arab) 30% and black
30%. About 15% of the black population are slaves owned by whites or
Arabs. The practice of slavery in Mauritania is not new. Since the 12th cen-
tury descendants of Arab and Berber from the north, known as beydane,
began the enslavement of the black Africans, mainly the Tukulor, the Fulani,
and the Wolof. French colonialists outlawed slavery in 1905, but to no effect.
Slavery was outlawed again at independence in 1960, and for the third time
when Mauritania joined the United Nations in 1961. The prohibition of slav-
ery was written into law in Ordinance no. 81.234 of 9 November 1981.
Article 1 (State Integrity, Equal Protection) of the 12 July 1991 Constitution
goes further, stating that: 1) Mauritania is an indivisible, democratic, and
social Islamic Republic; 2) the Republic guarantees equality before the law
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to all of its citizens without distinction as to origin, race, sex, or social con-
dition; 3) the law shall punish all particularistic propaganda of racial or eth-
nic character.
The continuation of slavery in Mauritania could be attributed to the state's
identification and expression of the majority's interest in cheap labour and
the suppression of the aspirations of its black populations. Historically, on
the eve of independence in 1960, Mauritania had to choose where the coun-
try belongs: in Africa, where it is located, or in the Arab world. The Arab and
Berber populations wanted the country to be part of Morocco, which mobi-
lized the Arab world to assist it in annexing the north. The African
Mauritanians formed two political parties which demanded that the country
should either be independent or federated with Senegal (Dialo 1993). The
tension between those who claim that Mauritania is an Arab nation and those
who claim that it is an African country with diverse nationalities has contin-
ued unabated until the present day. However, behind the African-Arab divide
there is slavery, the shame of humanity.
I am ashamed to mention that there are reports of a resurgence of slavery in
the southern parts ofmy country of birth, the Sudan, as a result of problems
no different from those haunting political minorities elsewhere in the world.
No matter how some apologists may claim that what is taking place in the
Sudan is a traditional form of labour recruitment, or the taking of prisoners
of war or captives of choice, the fact of the matter remains that an extreme
injustice has been committed against the conscious minority of Southern
Sudan.
The Muslim Rohingya are one of 21 ethnic groups in Burma of which the
Tibeto-Burman, the Tai, the Karen, and the Mon constitute the majority. The
Rohingya originated from the Middle East, living as traders in the coastal
areas. Some of them amassed wealth, which became the envy of the ruling
Tibeto-Burman majority. Again, the idea of the nation-state is behind the
oppression and subsequent struggle for self-determination of the Rohingya.
The origins of their struggle lie in the struggle for independence which unit-
ed the Burmese against the British/rule. However, after gaining indepen-
dence, the Burmese freedom fighters led by Aung San pressed for the devel-
opment of a Burmese nation-state predicated on the Burman majority iden-
tity. After the 1962 military coup which brought General Ne Win to power
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(1962-1988), ethnic-minority groups were further marginalized and felt that
they were being treated as second-class citizens. In relation to the Burman
majority and are socially, politically and culturally discriminated against.
Since then, ethnic minority groups have been at the forefront of the armed
struggle against the military dictatorship. The Rohingya have also suffered
grave human "rights abuses committed by the state organs. It is true that all
the people ofBurma have suffered under the military rule, but the minorities
have suffered most from the reconstruction of a nation-state that does not sat-
isfy the minimum requirements of nationhood.
Dislocation and displacement
External global influences result in dislocation and disparity, leading to con-
flict intensification and a serious threat to social peace. In the case of
Indonesia, many observers agree that tensions between the majority
Indonesians and the minority Chinese, who control most of the nation's
wealth, existed long before the crash of the Asian markets in 1994. However,
there is also a commonly held view that the crash contributed to the aggra-
vation of minority-dominant majority relations." From the 1965 attacks on
the Chinese minority to the Medan labour riot in May 1994, many
Indonesian Chinese have been physically assaulted or even killed in arson
attacks, and their businesses torched or looted. The May 1998 riots are
reported to have claimed the lives of 1300 ethnic Chinese.
Taking advantage of the efforts to democratize the Indonesian state, ethnic
Chinese began to seek ways to reinvent their culture, language and religion.
I am very sceptical whether the current democratization process will provide
sufficient guarantees to safeguard the ethnic Chinese, who represent only 3-
3.5% of Indonesia's 220 million people, and how much of their historical
identity will be tolerated and hence accommodated by the Indonesian state
and majority populations.
The broader implications of these case studies challenge the assumption that
the state is always even-handed in using its monopoly of power to stifle the
rights of its citizens - majority or minority. In reality the state does in certain
historical circumstances keep silent, refrain from protecting its minority, or
deliberately organize it to commit atrocities against its minorities. The latter
is very well represented by the cases of the European Jews, Rwanda, Bosnia,
Kosovo, East Timor and the like. In all these cases the state abused its dual
10
function of restriction and protection by neither restricting those poised to
attack the minority, nor protecting the minority by exercising its right to
compel compliance through the use or threat offorce. The majority that gives
legitimacy to the state also lays claim to restricting the legitimate authority
to use power and coercion to justify obedience. Although the state is legally
mandated to ensure compliance with the .'rules of the house', this principle
is unevenly used - as the case studies have shown.
Minority conflict within real or imagined nation-states stems precisely from
the tension between the conception of the nation-state and the state of a
national majority from which it derives the claim to power. The state
becomes an embodiment of authority, rights, liberty and freedom - all of
which are socially constructed by the majority. While minority position in
the state is dependent on how broad the majority defines these value-laden
concepts, the practical implications of their application in real life situations
would have serious implications for the majority.
The minority-dominant majority case studies reveal claims of the eclipse of
the nation-state to have no practical or theoretical foundation, as there are no
states without peoples whether they are defined by ethnicity, language, cul-
ture or any other attributes. This is even more so in the developing world
where there is no evidence to support the myth of the decline of the nation-
state. In the developing world we are in fact confronted with an increasing
number of nations in search of states out of the multitude of nations that
compete to maintain, reinforce or transform the state of the nations into a
nation-state. The majority of those who are in search of a state are minority
groups that have not been able to identify with artificially constructed
nation-states in which they have found little or no opportunity to express
their historical identities and are unrepresented, excluded, even oppressed
and discriminated against.
Although some have argued that this is the result of the development of
transnational, mainly regional identities, such as the Eurr'l ean Union, it is
the pervasive role of globalization, international migration and other factors
that have delimited the imposing presence of the nation-state in the industri-
ally advanced countries. This optimistic view could be confronted with the
presence of strong national or sub-regional identities within some of the EU
states (Britain, Spain, France, Italy, Germany and Belgium, to give only a ~
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few examples). The mistake often made is the confusion of the convention-
al functions of the state with what constitutes the state. If the state is consti-
tuted of people and derives its legitimacy and authority from those who con-
stitute it, the main change that has occurred during the late 20th century is
that the state constituents have become more diverse, through migration -
forced or' spontaneous. This diversity is a source of enrichment as well as
cause of conflict between values and belief mixed more intensely than ever
before. While the conventional nation-state has lost its quasi-national identi-
ty, it has been replaced by a virtual nation-state with a distinctive historical
identity vis-a-vis the other minority historical identities that co-exist with it.
Minority-dominant majority relations, questions of multiculturalism and its
critics stem from the very co-existence of a dominant state that strives to dis-
charge its functions to a confident nation-state that envisages no threat from
its majority. In contrast to the confidence of the virtual nation-state, there is
the vulnerability of ordinary citizens of the original state who, are not confi-
dent, accommodating or tolerant.
The vulnerability of the states that are in search of nations, and the confident
virtual nation-states that have become more sensitive to minority issues have
not managed to develop institutions capable of dealing with these issues. The
legacy of the nation-state in developing countries still haunts the politics of
representation, order and development and its distinctive role in minority-
dominant majority relations. While the nation-state in the west found in
democracy the magic of representation, the uncritical transfer of this magic
to developing countries has in some instances just created more problems.
Minorities and democracy
Governing minority-dominant majority relations and their representation in
the modem nation-state has produced some of the most creative, as well as
the most absurd, political arrangements in human history." They range from
federalism and decentralization to apartheid, Fascism and Nazism. However,
this is not the subject of this paper. This section is concerned mainly with
minorities and democracy in an attempt to show how, although minorities
may fare better in a democratic regime, minority position depends more on
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the nature of the dominant nation that constitutes the nation-state than on
democracy. In order to articulate this position, I introduce two notions of
majoritarianism. The first is the majoritarian tyranny thesis and its critique.
The second is derived from the specificity of the developing world context,
where the absence of nation-states redefines democratic majority in terms of
majority ethnic, religious, cultural9r linguistic group. Although majority has
different connotations in mature and transition democracies, it has two com-
mon features in both types of democracy: 1) majority rule in both cases is in
reality a minority rule and 2) the majority is a social construct informed by
the dominant power structure.
Regular and periodic elections in which political parties and organizations
freely compete for power are considered a prudent institutional mechanism
for ensuring representation and participation in the political process leading
to the formation of a government. As an institutional framework for practis-
ing politics and competing for controlling state power, political parties
endow regimes with internal and, nowadays, external legitimacy.
In parliamentary democracies, the chief executive is elected by and respon-
sible to, the legislature (Lijphart 1984). The government must at various
junctures acquire legislative majorities in order to perform its constitutional
functions. In general there are two critical tests of government majorities:
confidence motions and final votes on bills (Strom 1990). Majority rule is at
the heart of the notion of a democratic nation-state in the western tradition,
since the government is voted in by a majority of the population according to
individual preference.
The universal preference for majoritarian democracy, despite its tyrannical
potential, can be justified according to Dahl (1989) on four grounds: 1) it
maximizes self-determination, or the insurance that the greatest possible
number of people live under a government they have participated in choos-
ing; 2) it is the necessary result of the reasonable requirement that decisions
in society are agreed by the majority; 3) it is more likely to produce correct
decisions, i.e. a majority is one way to test whether an assertion is true 4) It
maximizes utility, in other words, a larger number of citizens gain at least as
much benefit (or utility, or satisfaction, etc) than under minority rule.
However, Dahl is mindful of the fact that power is exerted from multiple
centres, which ensures a balance of power between contending actors.
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Although this is true for those who command the majority, its relevance to
minority groups with no influence on the polity of the dominant 'nation' is
questionable.
All four attributes are positivist structurally determined by the aggregation of
individual preferences, which are considered more tangible and verifiable.
Majoritarianism is therefore considered superior to other forms of represen-
tation because 1) it gives equal consideration of interests by availing ade-
quate and equal opportunities for expressing societal or national preferences
(Dworkin 1983, Miller 1973); 2) in the liberal tradition it ensures the pre-
sumption of personal autonomy through voting at the decisive stage (Rawls
1993; Dahl 1989); 3) in the enlightened tradition it vindicates the democrat-
ic process and its outcomes (Gray 1986); 4) It contributes to a widely accept-
ed and supported national policy framework and ensures majority control
and influence of state-wide policy decisions (Barry 1989); 5) ideally, state
legitimacy holds governance accountable to citizens (Held 1996).
There are two contradictory notions in how the dominant discourse of liber-
ty and freedom has been associated with the question of power. Liberty and
freedom are positive expressions of rights that, in majoritarian democratic
societies, are restricted by law and regulated by the state. Liberals generally
consider restrictive and regulatory state institutions and legal instruments in
the field of individual property as an invasion of private property rights. In
this scheme of thought, liberals are so blinded by protecting property rights
that they contrive to undercut both state and democracy.
Although the attributes of majoritarian rule are discernible, the question
often asked is whether the minority is rational in discharging its responsibil-
ity to the majority. To what extent can democracy itself be used as an instru-
ment perpetuating majority dominance over the minority to the extent of
oppressing its legitimate claims? Is the expectation then that the minority
should be submissive in the face ofa demographic majority capable oftrans-
lating human numbers into instruments legitimizing majoritarian tyranny
under a democratic rule?
State neutrality, supported by a modicum of legal instruments, is conceived
as a way of restraining the majority from abusing the rights of the minority.
The question is how can the state (democratic or authoritarian) be neutral in
value-laden issues such as power, freedom, liberty and rights, particularly in
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situations where it is constituted alongside the value preferences of the
majority? Plant (1991:77) asks, 'how natural is it that liberalism, committed
to moral neutrality, should turn its attention away from the goals of human
fulfilment just because these are contestable'. By implication, state neutrali-
ty itself is a political ideology committed to serving the interests of those
who either have enough 'So that they do not need the state or want the state
to become amere 'gatekeeper' of their interests, while they exercise domi-
nance. State neutrality not only unravels the tension between liberalism and
democracy, as has commonly been stated in the literature (Gray 1986:74),
but questions whether majoritarian democracy makes the minority sub-
servient to the majority through a crude aggregation of individual prefer-
ences."
If the critique of majoritarianism is relevant to western societies, where it
originated, the relevance of this critique to societies where political commu-
nity matters is even more profound." The social environment, within which
political parties have been conceived, established, managed and operated in
any society influences their relationship to power and the state. In most of
the developing world, with a few exceptions, ethnicity, religion, culture and
language socially inform the political parties, and not modem ideological
strands. Developing country political parties are elite-dominated yet they do
not reflect the claims to modernity espoused by the elite. Political mobiliza-
tion continues along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines, thus denying the
spectre of political modernization.
The concept of state neutrality becomes obsolete in societies where the elite
of the largest religious, ethnic or linguistic group also forms the majority, as
defined by the performance of political parties in elections. A pervasive and
limited elite (limited by economic opportunities as well as sufficiently long-
experience with democracy) in democratic societies contributes to the con-
centration rather the separation of power. This is mainly because, as legal
institutions competing for access to power, political parties' main concern is
to monopolize power in all its manifestations (legislative, executive and judi-
ciary). In states that consist of several nations, the neutrality of the state,
which promises an unrealistically heightened expectation of justice, is com-
promised by this tangle of nation and state. As an imported notion, liberal
democracy denies the realities ofmost of the developing world, in which col-
lectivity rather than individuality counts. Ifpo1itical community is lost to the
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western world, there is no reason to believe that communal values and col-
lectivity are lost to the rest of the world (Plant 1991). Here lies the poverty
of individualistic egoism and its conjuncture with majority rule.
Obviously, the democratic nation-state ensures the dominance of the domi-
nant nation or nations that constitute the majority. Furthermore, it denies
minority possibilities to secure political representation in two ways: 1)
minority strength lies not in aggregated individual preferences, but in the
ability to use the collective will of its membership to survive, sometimes
against an oppressive majority; 2) by assigning individual preferences a legal
entity and a higher value in the democratic process, majoritarian democra-
cies attack the very basis of minority strength by laying the political ground
rules that stifle their collective strength.
In fact, liberalism and democracy are at odds, particularly as the former
makes a deliberate separation between economic and social freedoms on the
one hand and political freedom on the other. Whether freedom is the absence
of impediments to motion, the absence of deliberate interference by other
people, or the personal possession of physical objects (Miller 1991), we are
made to believe that there are positive (protective) and negative (restriction)
freedoms. The first is the deliberate relegation ofthe individual's social envi-
romnent to a secondary position. Liberals adhere to this notion because by
negating that the individual's freedom depends on material resources the
issue of economic redistribution is presented as unimportant in attaining
freedom. In other words, by separating economic freedom from social and
political freedom, liberals hope to keep the economic domain of freedom
untouched by the state.
The theoretical polemic on majoritarian tyranny aside, the empirical evi-
dence about how democratic governments command a small proportion of
votes is equally revealing. Voter turnout across the globe rose steadily
between 1945 and 1990 - increasing from 61% in the 1940s to 68% in the
1980s. However; the post-1990 average has dropped back to 64%. Figures
from 1945 to 1997 reveal that Western Europe has maintained the highest
turnout (77%), followed by South, North and Central America (68%), with
lowest turnout in Africa (53%). Voter turnout in the Middle East and Asia hit
high points in the 1980s (62%) but slipped back in the 1990s (54%).
Globally, turnout during 1990 and 1997 dropped sharply to 62%, the lowest
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in post-war history (IDEA 1997).12
Although the statistics for voter turnout have been constant on average, the
fact remains that no government in the democratic world has been able to
win the majority of votes. To that extent a parliamentary majority is not nec-
essarily backed. by the majority of the. voters, due to differences in voter
turnout. Judging by the rates of turnout I have just shown, any political party
that could win 35 to 45% of the votes of the 70% who actually voted could
attain a commendable parliamentary majority.
In terms of voting age population (VAP), voter turnout is actually disap-
pointing. For instance, during the 1990s VAP turnout for the USA was
44.9%, for India 59.2% and for the Netherlands 75.2%. The lowest VAP
turnout was in Sub-Saharan Africa: Egypt 27.7%, Senegal 26.7%, Burkina
Faso 26.7 % and Mali, the lowest of the lowest in terms ofVAP turnout, was
21.9%.
It is obvious that parliamentary majority says less about the participation of
the majority of the population eligible to vote and more about the majority
that has actually voted." To this extent, majority is more the faith, fetishism
and a social construct generated by majoritarian tyrants. It is a system ofrep-
resentation based on a positivist aggregation of individual preferences that
keeps silent about those who have not voted because it assumes that it is dif-
ficult to verify their preferences.
Obviously, the debate on elections in the developing countries and majority
representation is relevant to the current upsurge of democratization in the
developing countries. This is so because these countries have devoted much
attention to ensuring majority rule in what is sometimes tantamount to the
neglect of the minority in Westminster-style democracies premised on first-
past-the-post or 'the winner takes all' majoritarian tradition. Majority rule as
prescribed in western democracies has often clashed with the conduct of
democracy in severely divided societies. Majority ethnicity, language, cul-
ture, religion are often used to justify its control of the state, power and the
resources that come with it. The struggle to control the state often develops
into a source of conflict, particularly when difference is used as instrument
of political domination or a justification for supremacy over others.
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The current democratization crusade is based first and foremost on the cen-
trality of private property rights; second, liberty, including the right to basic
physical security, the freedom of speech and conscience, freedom of move-
ment, the right to privacy and the right to participate in politics; third, limit-
ing the scope of the state; fourth, the liberals have a divided attitude toward
the market, 'the system of private property and free exchange of economic
goods and services; fifth, progress, in promising enlightenment, tolerance,
individual freedom and equality of opportunity (Festenstein 1998: 14-17).
The main problem here is that regardless of the general sentiments of the lib-
eral democratic conception of the state, market, property and individual free-
dom, the question remains in what type of societies this conception applies
and under what circumstances.
In severely divided societies the problem is less of managing diversity than
of accommodating minorities in a fair system of power sharing. Obviously,
minority representation in first-past-the-post democratic systems poses a
serious challenge to the capacity of the system to be genuinely democratic.
Because numerical minorities lack sufficient votes to ensure effective repre-
sentation, the capacity of democracy alone to ensure equitable and just rep-
resentation is questionable. Where the disadvantages ofnumerical and social
minorities are combined, they would certainly lose out in first-past-the-post
systems because they command neither sufficient material resources nor
votes to be fully represented in the legislature, and hence feel alienated by
the very democratic process.
However, the minority/majority question is not only a quantitative one about
assembling votes. The difficulties occur in three problematic areas. Firstly,
in cases where the majority vote for candidates from their own ethnic groups,
the largest ethnic group also produces the largest number ofmembers ofpar-
liament and may therefore control the state indefinitely. The predictability of
the ethnic vote may make a mockery of the elections, infuriating and frus-
trating the minority ethnic groups. Secondly, minorities living under a dom-
inant 'supermajority' may resort to non-democratic means, such as the mili-
tary, to control the state. Thirdly, interest aggregation through minority group
coalitions could provide a possible answer to the tyranny of the majority.
However, such an option depends on the minorities being large enough in
number to tilt the political process in their favour. 14 Minorities are disadvan-
taged not only because they are small in size, although this is an important
18
factor in their rising to power in a parliamentary democracy. In some
instances, it is also because they are consciously excluded and as such unable
to influence the political process on an equal footing with the majority."
While the majoritarian tradition has its merits (such as maximizing utility
and self-determination), majority rule without legislative safeguards and
long democratic experience, can be used as an instrument of domination.
Minority groups that feel they have no hope of accessing state power and
influencing decisions that they may perceive as detrimental to their well-
being (or survival) may take extra-jurisdictional steps (such as military
coups, election rigging, fraud, etc.) to control the state.
The minority position in the nation-state and how it may fare in majoritarian
democracy cannot be isolated from the wider political and economic envi-
ronment within which democracy operates. Because the state consists of a
set of organizations judicially located in a particular territory, invested with
the authority to make binding decisions and to implement these decisions
using force ifnecessary, it is also an arena where different social forces com-
pete for power. Power - the ability to make policy decisions, influence and
even change policies through legitimate means - is neither neutral, as liber-
als make out, or without anchorage in the social forces that make up society.
In developing countries, the state assumes an even greater significance in the
pattern ofpower that determines access to social and material resources. The
centrality of the state becomes more significant in the field of development,
where the combined effects of resource distribution and conflict over
resources are apparent. The social forces that control the state are also capa-
ble ofusing the state organizations to pursue their interests in an arena char-
acterized by domination and opposition.
The formation of political parties and institutions identical to those in the
west would strengthen rather than weaken the very forces that western
observers hold responsible for conflict and political instability. The majority
of the political institutions are often ethnically, culturally, religiously and lin-
guistically based and represent distinct nations. In the democratic game,
however, the elite considers them modern political institutions with no con-
nection to traditional values. In other words, the political parties the elite cre-
ates out of the womb of traditional values are expected to behave like their
western counterparts, a responsibility these prototype institutions are ill-pre-
pared to undertake in form or content. Second, instead of integration, democ-
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racy opens the door to political participation, but often not on terms origi-
nally anticipated by its architects. Although this should be viewed as a posi-
tive outcome, minorities tend to overreact to expansion of their interests,
including the possibility of realizing their own independent state. Third, the
majority may use the power of the vote or the fist of the security forces to
stall political decisions necessary for undertaking significant reforms.
In most developing countries, the dominant forces structurally determine the
fate of democracy. People's voices are either selectively heard or systemati-
cally silenced, using democracy as an instrument of oppression. However, an
authoritarian circus rotating between military and civilian politicians fosters
the circulation of authoritarian development benefits. Thus, like authoritari-
anism, democracy under conditions of extreme poverty leaves the door wide
open for the enrichment of a politically vocal, educated urban, rent-seeking
and land-based elite. It leaves out minority because it commands the votes
and materialresources to enable the access power or pursue its interests.
Minority and authoritarian development
Conventional authoritarian development refers to authoritarian regimes per-
forming well in terms of economic growth, while denying the human and
other civil rights of their citizens. Implicit in this notion of authoritarian
development is that the state is neutral in abusing the rights of citizens
regardless of religious, ethnic, political or linguistic affiliation. This is in fact
is one of the common trappings of western originated development theories
that treat underdevelopment from a nation-state perspective. I redefine
authoritarian development from a minority perspective to denote state poli-
cies that displace people from their sources of livelihood in the name of
development. The tenets of this definition will be elaborated below.
In the developing world development is a resource in its own right and an
activity which various social forces try to define according to their interests.
But the struggle for development is not only a demand or self-serving inter-
est, because from perspective of most developing countries, development is
an ideology encompassing the dual discourses of modernization and nation
building. Alee (1996: 7) succinctly argues that, 'development is an attractive
idea for forging a sense of common cause and for bringing some coherence
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to the fragmented political system inherited from the colonial rule, a system
suffocated by an irresponsible political elite'. More importantly, even where
modernization is rejected in favour of indigenization, development could not
be abandoned because it was the ideology by which the political elite hoped
to create a sense of unity, survive popular discontent and perpetuate its con-
trol of state power. As an ideology, development is also an expression of the
preferences of the individuals aggregated in a dominant majority, represent-
ed by a minority elite capable ofusing state power to advance their own par-
ticular notion of development.
National development, whatever that is taken to mean, is justified even if it
entails the eviction, displacement or impoverishment of the poor or denial of
the resources essential for their livelihood. Within development ideology, the
elite of the dominant majority in the developing world found an easy prey in
the lands and resources of minority groups. I am not aware of any develop-
ing country that has not stipulated special provisions for what are known as
'development tenure policies'. These policies empower state agents to evict
people from any land, river or sea coast that the state decides to use for
national interests, including development, military purposes, etc.
Understandably the state has become an arena of conflict between compet-
ing social forces and those forces that have been able to dominate it can also
dominate others and subjugate them to their will.
Authoritarian development contributes to the impoverishment and displace-
ment of minorities that inhabit areas endowed with natural riches. In most
such cases, because of majoritarian democracy or totalitarian regimes, the
victim's voice is inaudible (Mohamed Salih 1987, 1994 and 1999). A global
minority (backed by the international community) is supported by a power-
ful national business elite (backed by the state). It uses state power to con-
trol resources (such as land, water, minerals, oil etc.) and evict local com-
munities from resources vital for their survival. The eviction in most cases
takes place without consultation or compensation.
Authoritarian development denies peoples the right to livelihood resources in
the name of progress and nation building. In reality it frustrates both. Its
dismal record includes the destruction of the lives of peoples such as the
Nuba. Numbering over one million people, the Nuba are the indigenous
inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains of Western Sudan. Politically and eGO-
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· nomically marginalized the Nuba are undergoing a sinister campaign of
human rights abuse by the Sudanese state, including genocide and ethnocide
(or cultural genocide). Between 1973 and 1994, the Sudanese government
introduced large-scale, privately-owned agricultural schemes in the Nuba
Mountains, about 2000 km southwest of the capital, Khartoum. People's
attempts to-relocate in other areas were hampered by the state. The large-
scale privately owned mechanized farms (covering over eight million
hectares) exclude small peasants, while their location in the intermediate
land between the semi-arid zone and the rich savannah is a potential source
of conflict between pastoralists and farmers. The appropriation ofNuba land
by a privileged political and business elite in the name of development has
occurred under both democratically elected and non-democratic Sudanese
governments. In fact, when it lost seats in the Nuba Mountains during the
1986 elections, the Umma (Nation) did nothing to stop the Popular Defence
Force (the government-organized militia) from committing a series of mas-
sacres between 1986 and 1988 (Ryle 1988). The same democratically elect-
ed government prevented the Nuba victims of the 1985 drought and famine
from resettling in the more fertile lands southward. As a startling illustration
of the alliance between authoritarian development and state oppression, the
army and the police force prevented the victims of drought and famine from
moving into 'state-owned' fertile lands. The state staunchly opposed their
spontaneous settlement, claiming that these exceptionally fertile lands were
demarcated for future expansion of large-scale private mechanized farms
(Mohamed Salih 1999a and 1999b). These farms have in recent years been
distributed to an expanding Islamic business elite supported by various
Islamic banks and financial lending organizations.
In the developing countries, there are 95 recorded incidences ofdisplacement
by authoritarian development. The majority of the victims are minority
groups referred to in other literature as indigenous peoples. Among the major
features of authoritarian development are the following:
1 It serves interests (global capital, national private interests; rent-seeking
politicians etc.) other than those of the intended beneficiaries, to the
detriment of local communities.
2 It is implemented from the top down, without the consultation or
involvement of local communities.
3 It uses force and coercion, including the police and the army, to evict
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those who oppose evacuation.
4 It does not compensate those who are evicted and are left to fend for
themselves after having been stripped of the land on which they depend
for their survival.
5 It abuses the human, economic and political rights of those evicted from
their sources of livelihood by force and denies them the right to self-
development.
In short, authoritarian development is characterized by excessive centraliza-
tion in which development is treated as a monopoly exercised by the central
organs of the state. It reflects the way in which development is defined in
terms inconsistent with the interests of the local peoples and the minority
groups alienated from their land and other natural riches. In the face of the
appropriation of local community land, collective minority struggle becomes
a major institutional framework for protecting common interests and chan-
nelling resentment against poverty-inducing development policies. For its
part, the state perceives local communities' survival concerns and livelihood
struggles as testimony to the misconception that ethnicity is a hindrance to
development and an archaic institutional framework for political organiza-
tion. Authoritarian development treats minority rights as an obstacle to
development and a source of conflict detrimental to development.
By its very nature, authoritarian development contributes to conflict and
political oppression, and invites insurgency. It is an arena where the limita-
tions of majoritarianism are revealed and its capacity to tame the state is in
question. In other words, authoritarianism breeds violence and invites more
authoritarianism, and increasingly develops brutal ways of using the state's
monopoly over the use of force and coercion to legitimize its holding onto
power.
Authoritarian development is a mirror of how the dominant majority treats
its minorities. In democratic states, authoritarian development represents the
will of those who represent the majority the operate the nation-state and
could therefore be a direct consequence of majority tyranny. The dominant
.forces that control state power also control and distribute resources to the
majority in anticipation of political rewards. In fact authoritarian develop-
ment creates an arena for the state to demonstrate its monopoly over the use
ofpower in coercion, not to maintain peace and order as originally premised,
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but to ensure compliance with undesirable policies. In this respect, the rela-
tionship between authoritarianism and state oppression is all too obvious.
With the failure of the state to become an arbiter of different ethnic claims or
an engine of development, the use of force and coercion to secure political
legitimacy became a dominant feature of authoritarian development. In these
circumstances, both democratic and authoritarian states have shifted their
main objectives away from development to simply managing and maintain-
ingpeace and order. In response, the people's recipe for humanizing devel-
opment is to democratize the state. Restructuring authoritarian development
requires the reversal of the logic of exclusion and the empowerment of insti-
tutions that foster distributive justice and empower the poor to access
resources vital to their survival such as land, water, forest. These are the very
resources that authoritarian development appropriates as an exclusive
domain for its destructive interventions. True democracy is akin to true
development and both should. ideally be responsive to people's needs, and
particularly to the needs of the excluded minority.
Authoritarian development has had negative consequences for minority
groups because democracy legitimizes the policies of democratically elected
governments. The current democratic crusade condones the notion that if it
is majoritarian then it must be democratic, therefore allowing virtual democ-
rats to behave like dictators and go along with it. When the state colludes
with the dominant minority, the state often uses democracy to perpetuate
hegemony rather than to advance rights, liberty and democracy. The adop-
tion of non-democratic measures is often justified against the backdrop of
achieving 'national' objectives through a democratic mandate.
Conclusion
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a proliferation ofintemational conventions,
declarations and covenants with some reference to minority issues. It took
these intentions more than three decades to mature and culminate in the
enactment of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic,
Religion and Linguistic Minorities, This declaration cannot be viewed in iso-
lation from the problems inherent in the three trajectories which I have tried
to explicate - the nation-state, democracy and authoritarian development;
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and even more so as the catalogue of genocide, discrimination and oppres-
sion ofpeoples belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities shows
no signs of decreasing. Because of the centrality of state, democracy and
development in the excesses committed against minority groups, the ethos
inherent in these social constructs should be criticized and not idealized.
Hence, minority-dominant majority questions cannot be isolated from the
wider debate on state, democracy and development.
I have tried to explain that tense minority-dominant majority relations have
engulfed the state in a heightened politics of order in which it strives to con-
tain minority discontent." In the developing world, development is still the
rallying consensus, even though it represents a missed opportunity to engen-
der democratic values. Authoritarian development has become an instrument
for legitimizing the state while disempowering the minority. In fact, it has
become a source of intense social conflict, liberation movements and insur-
gency, thus challenging both state legitimacy and the politics of order.17
Implicit in this paper is the contention that the triple heritage of democracy,
human rights and institutional governance has given way to two major con-
tradictions between state and democracy, and between liberty and democra-
cy. The omnipotence of the majority which legitimizes the state takes the
form ofa despotic public opinion used by the state operators to justify minor-
ity oppression. Crick (1962), a devout critic of democracy, laments that in its
extreme form democrats are obliged to accept decisions reached by the
majority even when the majority favours rule by a tyrant. In such circum-
stances, the state will be the provider ofneither liberty nor democracy for the
oppressed minorities. IS It virtual democracies, state legitimacy justifies
authoritarian development, therefore taking by the left hand the constitution-
al rights it has given by the right.
The question that I pose here is where does the politics of order leave minori-
ties in the politics of alternative development? The. simple answer is
nowhere. A more realistic answer is that the world is probably at the cross-
roads. This is illustrated by the emergence of nee-Nazism, ultra-nationalists
and political opportunists - such as George Speight, the Fiji coup leader who
ousted the majority Indian government. Another example is the Ivory Coast
government's Ivorization policy, endorsed by the 2000 Constitution."
25
The politics of development promised that 'stable and consolidated democ-
racy correlates with a higher respect for human rights. Likewise, democracy
offers the possibility of political stability and with it the opportunity to redi-
~ rect resources and build institutions that can foster the cause of development
through fairer competition, participation and civil and political liberties'
(Sorensen 1993: 88). The alternative politics of development, on the other
hand, questions democracy's capacity to promote development, social wel-
fare, human rights and political stability without due consideration to minor-
ity-dominant majority relations. Within this premise, there is ample evidence
to challenge the corroborated evidence which shows that democracy pro-
motes development and vice versa (including Sorensen 1993; Bagchi 1995;
Cammack 1997; Bhardwaj and Vijayalcrishnan 1998). Certainly, this asser-
tion is true in the context of mature polyarchies and less so in countries that
have just began to experiment with a democratic tradition based on individ-
ual preference while the bulle of the society .is organized in diverse minority
political communities. .
In the new context of development, minority-dominant majority problems
have contributed to the reincarnation of the politics of order, with two dis-
tinct features: 1) a critique of the majoritarian ethos ushered in the current
tampering with the triple heritage ofdemocracy, human rights and good gov-
ernance; 2) the presence of a heightened tension in minority-dominant
majority relations, both in the industrially developed and developing coun-
tries, leading to the search for solutions outside the existing state institution-
al make up - social movements, liberation fronts, insurgency etc. The poli-
tics of alternative development becomes an alternative to authoritarian
development and thus integrates minority concerns as part of a paradigm
shift that searches for commonalties while acknowledging difference. The
alternative to this alternative is a polity beyond the bounds of civility and
devoid of all that is humanely desirable and practically possible.
This paradigm shift signifies a move from development to the bare mainte-
nance ofpeace and order, including humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping
and crisis management, and would do little to aid the triple heritage of
democratization, human rights and good governance. It is in fact a home-
coming, retracing the footsteps of the politics of development." Surely, a
politics that is proud of returning to its roots would inherit an entire package
structurally linked to those roots. It has to succumb to all the critique its
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antecedents had to endure.
Unless critically examined, the new politics of development may ensure nei-
ther development nor order. It would in fact do little to allay our fears of the
presence of a majority that can use the instrument of representative govern-
ment to block essential changes in the minority-dominant majority rela-
tions," It is not comforting either to realize that the dominant nation within
the nation-state should abandon its responsibility to a vocal minority that
claims a virtual majority voice by striving to deny its existence. Apolis with-
out a demos is a political abstraction hostile to majority rule no matter how
we define it, and one that is uncomfortable with the ethos ofmutual co-exis-
tence.
Although the alternative politics of development is, to a large extent, preoc-
cupied with old problems, it is so in a changing global context. Its main fea-
tures include the strengthening of democratic institutions such as political
parties, associations and civil society organizations; constitutional and elec-
toral reforms; reinforcing the rule of law and the legislature, and enhancing
the role of global governance; and strengthening the private sector as part of,
in my view, a misconceived concept of civil society.
The politics of order in the western liberal democratic context is not con-
cerned with how to improve minority-majority relations, but with how to
access power. Minority-dominant majority relations themselves can be used
as a political resource for accessing power. Human history; distant and
recent, is full of political opportunists who have turned minorities into ene-
mies in order to win elections and maintain a grip on power. Only time will
tell whether these strategies, including the promises and failures ofmulticul-
turalism, will bring about social peace.
As in the conventional politics of development, the alternative politics of
development conceptualizes democracy as a process leading to the restruc-
turing of authoritarian development. However, the alternative politics of
development would find it impossible to achieve this goal without democra-
tizing development, thus giving voice to the minorities that have suffered
from the excesses of authoritarian development. .
By its very nature, the democratic nation-state, real or virtual, perpetuates
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majoritarian tyranny, which in the developing countries represents a devout
ally of authoritarian development. Worse is the assumption that democracy
can thrive under conditions of rampant poverty, illiteracy, underdevelopment
and exploitation. By arguing that economic well-being is not necessarily a
prerequisite to the consolidation of democracy, the new politics of develop-
ment has unwittingly replayed the liberal separation between freedom and
material good.
From the minority perspective, the fate of liberal democracy has already
been decided by the pervasive nature of authoritarian development and a
majoritarian tyranny embedded in the politics of numbers. Authoritarian
development is incapable of either advancing freedom from poverty or offer-
ing an alternative development vision that creates opportunities, transparen-
cy guarantees, and social security." If minorities are excluded from power
sharing by majoritarian ethos, those very ethos have been at play in the strug-
gle to control state power through democratic means. Once power is secured,
it is used either by the majority to deny the minority the right to development
or to impose authoritarian development agents. Both democratic and author-
itarian states are engaged in the practice ofunjust authoritarian development.
In the best of the development agencies' intentions, these correlates (democ-
racy and development) pertain to the fact that the democratic crisis in the
developing world is ultimately linked to authoritarian development as the
major source of democratic malice.
The minority-dominant majority debate requires a broader understanding of
what development entails, whether the way it has been practised is con-
ducive to democracy and what role the state can play instead of succumbing
to the liberal tradition (discussed earlier), which calls for rolling back the
state.
Alternative development that has minority as part of its agenda requires what
Khotari (1993:123) calls, 'an alternative agenda in which the minority would
see fit to serve its interests'. This is 'not a spectacular or revolutionary cap-
ture of power with a view to producing a national utopia. It is, instead, far
more mundane yet far more basic - of taking the people seriously, respect-
ing their thinking and wisdom, and adopting attitudes and values that
respond to their voices. Voices from below, voices of the powerless who have
so often entrusted power to a political party or a set of parties within the par-
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liamentary framework but whose expectations have all along been belied'.
On the other hand, the alternative politics of development is wary of the cur-
rent institutionalization of the critique of resistance to structural change and
the adherence to, even worshipping of, a 'business as usual' approach, an
approach that addresses the symptoms and leaves the structural problems
intact. This view has to be seen within the political space available to a
majority that is neither unified nor uniform, a majority that often contains
enclaves of oppressed social minorities.
Majoritarian Tyranny in a World ofMinorities is not just an inquiry into the
world of the excluded, the underprivileged and oppressed, and those who
betrayed their human senses and succumbed to the familiarity of the norm.
It is a critique of civilization's failure to harness its mimetic impulses. A
destructive force seems in waiting, ready to attack." In his response to the
perilous case of minority - dominant majority relations in India, Ghandi
lamented 'history will judge civilization and people with power by the way
they treat their minorities'. It could be that in these real or imagined expres-
sions of minority or majority visions lies the true nature of oppression and
injustice in their most benign yet inhumane form.
Sadly, despite its quantum leaps in science, technology, political and eco-
nomic organization and other fields of human ingenuity, civilization has yet
to harness its mimetic impulses. In this respect alone, the critique of majori-
tarian tyranny is neither a rejection of democracy nor a call for the eclipse of
the state. It is a critique ofhow social constructs such as state, nation, democ-
racy, majority and minority mediate the structures that strive to control power
in order to define and redefine their positions in relation to these constructs.
Surely, at the most personal level, if we look within our inner selves we may
well realize that there is a minority inside each of us. The world is truly one
of minorities, dominated by a virtual majority that is capable of exacting its
tyrannical whim on the real majority. On the whole, minority-dominant
majority tensions reveal the structural deficiencies and problems confronting
the majority, rather than the minority's incapacity to contribute its share to
society.
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Notes
1. Young (1932) used the term minority in his book entitled American
Minority Peoples: A Study ofRacial and Cultural Contacts in the United
States.
2. These include organizations such as Minority Rights Group which was
established during the late 1960s, and the Covenant of the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations (The Peace Palace,
The Hague, February 11, 1991).
3. For more material on various aspect ofminority, human rights and inter-
national law see Watson (1990) Contemporary Minority Nationalism,
Brolrnann et al. (1993) Peoples and Minorities in International Law;
Heraclides (1991) The Self-determination ofMinorities in International
Politics; Lerner (1991) Group Rights and Discrimination in
International Law; Bloed (1999) Protection ofMinority Rights through
Bilateral Treaties
4. For example, the representative of Germany was one of the most out-
spoken' critics. He made it clear during the deliberations on the
Declaration that 'minority rights may not be interpreted as entitling any
group of persons living under the terms of immigration laws, to form
within the state, separate communities'. Quoted in the views of the
Human Rights Commission, para. 15, see A. Phillips and A. Rosas
(1993: 29).
5. Although women are a majority in the world, the United Nations con-
sider them a minority, a point raised at the 1995 Beijing conference on
women's issues and civil rights. People with a different sexual orienta-
tion from the majority of the population are also considered a minority
if the majority discriminates against them. See Townsend (1973) for
more on social minority.
6. See Mclaurin (199) The Political Role ofMinority Groups in the
Middle East.
7. For more on this trend ofwriting see Caporaso (1989) The Elusive State;
Hoffman (1995) Beyond the State; Holton (1998) Globalization and the
Nation-Sate, among others.
8. For instance, 'Horne Affairs Ministry No.455.2-360/1988 on the
Regulation of Temples' forbids any hind from being acquired for the
construction of Chinese temples, building any new temples, expanding
or renovating existing temples, or using any other building as a temple.
The second such policy is the Circular of the Director General for Press
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and Graphics Guidance in the Ministry ofInformation No.02/SElDitjen-
PPGK/1988. The Circular on Banning the Publication and Printing of
Writings and Advertisements in Chinese Characters or the Chinese
Language restricts the use of Chinese to a single newspaper called
Harian Indonesia. These measures were taken on, the ground that dis-
semination of materials in Chinese or Chinese characters will obstruct
the .goal of national unity and the process of assimilation of ethnic
Chinese.
9. For earlier writings on this see de Tocqueville (1945) Democracy in
America. The Henri Reeve text.
10. According to Gray (1986:74) limited government in the liberal tradition
'need not be democratic government'. While, on the one hand, unlimit-
ed democratic government cannot be liberal because government
authority invades all domains of liberty and independence, from a liber-
al point ofview even a limited government is a form oftotalitarianism -
the form predicted and criticized by J. S. Mill in On Liberty. Also see
Macewan (1999) Neo-Liberalism or Democracy for a critique of the
unholy relationship between market and democracy under the current
neo-liberal crusade.
11. For liberals the notion of any system of government that regulates prop-
erty rights and individual liberty by the vote of the majority cannot sat-
isfy the requirements of a democratic government. When a limited gov-
ernment is accepted then it must provide equal protection for individual
rights. Although democratic governments may provide better bases for
accountability in carrying out legal and constitutional provisions, there
is no reason to believe that democracy alone can ensure respect for indi-
vidual or, for that matter, collective minority rights.
12. For another critical commentary on prospects for democracy world-
wide see Vanhanen, (1997) Prospects ofDemocracy: A Study of172
Countries.
13. See Lakerman (1959) Voting in Democracies: A Study ofMajority
Rule and Proportional Electoral Systems. For the questions involved
in minority government see Strom (1990) Minority Government and
Majority Rule.
14. An example of this type of scenario is provided by the aggregation of
minority ethnic groups which voted Daniel Arap Moi into power in
Kenya's 1996 presidential election, beating Ford, who was supported by
the country's two largest ethnic groups, the Lou and K.ik:u.
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15. The case of the Creole minority in Sierra Leone - with their material
wealth and education - can be contrasted with that of the Hutu majority
in Burundi. The first is a demographic minority, while the second is a
political minority despite its demographic dominance.
16. On the politics of order see Randall and Theobald (1998) Political
Change and Underdevelopment and Culture and Democracy in
Developing Countries and Serensen, (1991) Democracy and
Democratization.
17. See Mohamed Salih (1999a and 1999b) in Environmental Politics and
Liberation and Land Alienation and 'Genocide in the Nuba Mountains,
respectively.
18. See Hoffinan (1995) Beyond the State, pp. 200-202.
19. The Ivory Coast's Constitution of 2000 was enacted against the back-
drop of Ivorization policies that stipulate that non-authentic Ivorians
cannot run. for political office. Former Prime Minister Allessane
Ouattara's was excluded from the 1999 presidential elections, because of
allegations that he had not provided adequate proof of Ivorian citi-
zenship. This is similar to the case of Ex-President Kaunda of Zambia
who was prohibited from re-running in the 1996 Presidential Elections
because, according to the Government, he is not Zambian.
20. Wiarda's (1997) Cracks in the Consensus: Debating the Democracy
Agenda in Us. Foreign Policy, reveals the current policy-makers
despair with regard to the increase in conflicts, even in democratic coun-
tries.
21. For more on this see Diamond (1993) Political Culture and Democracy
in Developing Countries.
22. Sen (1999:38) in Development as Freedom, argues that there are a num-
ber of interconnected and mutually reinforcing freedoms that influence
and are influenced by development. These are 1) political freedoms, 2)
economic facilities, 3) social opportunities, 4) transparency guarantees
and 5) protective security.
23. See Horkeimer, quoted in Mohamed Salih (1992), on European values
in international relations.
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